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Some people  fear that any  federal government  activity in land use
will be the harbinger of decay and demise  of the market economy  and
private property,  an irreversible step toward total government control
of all private land - in short, the first step on the road to socialism.
These arguments are not usually very convincing  because the federal
government  has  always had  a major  influence  on land  use,  at least
since  adopting  the  Land  Ordinance  for the  Northwest  Territory  in
1785. But there are valid policy  issues concerning how  the Feds will
be involved.
The Federal  Influence
The federal  government  already has a profound effect  on who uses
land,  how it is used, and where  various land uses take place.  Most of
the  federal  government  influence  occurs  as  indirect  results  of pro-
grams designed to attain other goals. (10) Farm commodity price sup-
port programs and federal crop insurance, for example, have had massive
land use effects, allowing crop production to extend into areas of sparse
rainfall in the western Great Plains.
Federal  income tax regulations,  particularly the mortgage interest
deduction and capital depreciation  rules, have  spurred urban  sprawl
in virtually every large or medium-sized city in the nation. The federal
interstate highway  system has strongly influenced  land use patterns
and contributed  to sprawl  in urban  areas and has provided a  strong
impetus to the growth of some rural towns and the decline  of others.
Federal grants for water and sewer programs  in rural  areas through
the Farmers  Home Administration have determined land use patterns
in hundreds of rural communities.  The wastewater planning and treat-
ment requirements, and the grant program, of the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act amendment have stopped land development in some
communities  by prohibiting  overuse  of treatment  facilities,  contrib-
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ment facilities that far exceed current  needs, limiting certain types of
industrial  expansion  in  certain  areas  of low  water  quality,  and nu-
merous  other effects.  Note  that these are  major land use effects, and
have the potential for substantially altering land use patterns. Similar
arguments  could be  made for the  effects  of the Clean  Air Act. These
prodigious  land use  effects of federal programs  might be termed  "un-
intended" or even "accidental" although in many cases the effects were
anticipated and  in fact  were the basis  for program  support.
Some  federal  government  influence  on  land  use  is  direct  and  ob-
vious.  About  one-third  of the nation's  land  is  in  federal  ownership.
Management  decisions  on  those  lands can  have  enormous  effects  on
the local  economy  and land use patterns in rural areas. A few federal
programs  are  explicitly  designed  to  influence  land  use,  such  as  the
Coastal  Zone Management  program which encourages state and local
land use controls  on the coasts. The effects of these direct attempts to
influence  land use  however,  seem  insignificant  compared  to the  un-
intended  or indirect effects  of other  federal programs.
The point  is this:  the federal government already exerts  a profound
influence  over  land  use  in  every  city  or rural  area  in  this country.
Unless  we  are  prepared  to  dismantle  many  major  federal  programs,
such as  farm commodity  programs,  crop  insurance,  and mortgage  in-
terest deductions, we must be willing to accept the fact that the federal
government will exert a strong  influence on land use. The more  rele-
vant issues are in whose interest will federal influence be exerted and
what additional  deliberate  role might the federal government  play  in
influencing land use change?
Our task  is to state the case  for more and  less federal involvement
in land use. The next section will state the case in favor of more federal
involvement in land use decisions.  The following section will state the
case  in  favor  of less  federal  involvement  and  the  final  section  will
discuss  some of the consequences  of changing the federal  role in land
use.
The Case  for MORE  Federal Involvement  in Land Use
Federal,  state  and  local  governments  have  powers  to regulate  pri-
vate actions on behalf of health and general welfare of the population.
Land use zoning is the familiar exercise  of the regulatory  power. Gov-
ernments also  have the power to  tax.  Any tax, whether  property,  in-
come,  sales, or excise,  becomes an element  of cost for the  payer, thus
influencing decisions that affect land. Governments  also can spend for
valid public  purposes.  All  governments  buy  land outright,  and may
influence  private use of land by offering selected  financial  bonuses to
land  users for  "socially  responsible"  actions.  Once  government  buys
land,  it has power to manage  it "in the public  interest." Finally,  gov-
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land market.
Choice among  levels of government  to exercise  any of these powers
involves judgments as to whose discretion should make a difference  in
the final  choice.  Certain  powers  have  been  specifically  delegated  to
the federal government by the Constitution while others comprise the
residual powers retained at the state level. (1,  pp. 381-383) The higher
the level  of decision,  from  fee  simple  owners  to  federal  government,
the broader the range  of preferences  that may impinge on choice and
the greater the chance  of internalizing the unintended  offsite  effects
of the  decision  made.  On  the  other hand,  it  is  likely that the more
people and interests that have the right to influence a certain decision,
the higher the cost of the process.  It is fairly easy and inexpensive  for
a  farmer  to  decide  to  ignore  erosion  on  his  riverside  field.  Once  a
downstream  farmer  complains  to  the  country  conservation  district,
though, costs of making choices start going up. Other preferences brought
to bear  at the state  level  may  lead  to  laws  against  erosion  to avoid
perceived  costs  to other people.  Federal  programs  and policies  to re-
duce  erosion  speak  to  even broader  interests,  at considerably  higher
transaction  costs and redistribution  of the right to  decide.
The  policy  question  seems  to  be for  which  land use  choices  is  the
range of interests  sufficiently  broad  to require  an active role  by the
federal  government,  and which  power  or  authority  of government  is
appropriate  to  each  case.  One's judgement  in  this matter  is  partly
conditioned  by the cost  of the  decision  process  and particularly  who
will pay  that cost.  Each authority  of government  implies  a different
distribution  of cost  between  landowner  and  taxpayer.  There  is  also
considerable  history and tradition  associated  with the  right of an in-
dividual to  own and  use land. The federal  government has tradition-
ally stayed away from most land use decisions.  There is value associated
with any tradition,  though  often  the  cost of a tradition  can  present
compelling evidence  for change.
The  case  for  more  federal  involvement  in  land  use  policy  can  be
simply stated: For many land use issues, the range of interests affected
and the geographic  distribution  of benefits and costs is so broad that
only the federal government  can provide for an efficient and equitable
resolution of the issue.  The case  can be made in several  ways.
First, some goods and services have benefits that are so widespread
that no private  firm  or state or local  government  could recapture  its
costs by charging users  of the  good or service. The  classic example  of
this type  of "public good" is national defense - when it is "produced"
for  one  individual,  all benefit,  and  no  one  can  be excluded  from  the
protection it affords.
Maintaining  the  productivity  of the  nation's  agricultural  land  is
very similar - actions to maintain productivity benefit  all consumers
and none can be excluded from the benefits. The economic strength  of
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namic,  successful agriculture.  There is a sort of "national well-being"
element  to U.S. agriculture,  and the land on which it depends.
Second,  federal involvement  is necessary  when  problems spill  over
local  and state boundaries  or when the technically  feasible  solutions
require coordinated  action among states. Attacking water or air qual-
ity problems,  and their basic land use causes,  cannot be easily accom-
plished  by  state  or  local  government.  When  the  boundaries  of the
problem overlap the boundaries  of state or local jurisdictions,  the only
feasible  solutions  involve federal  action.
A related argument is that federal action is warranted if the benefits
and  costs  of the  problem  and  its solution(s)  are  not distributed  pro-
portionally  among jurisdictions.  If a certain land use creates benefits
in state X but imposes costs on residents of state Y, there is no incen-
tive  for  state X  to consider  the  negative  consequences  of its actions,
to weigh the total costs and benefits of the land use activity. Only the
federal government  can view the problem broadly enough to weigh all
the relevant benefits and costs.
Fourth, federal involvement may be required if private markets ig-
nore  the  long-run  future  interest  of society.  Markets  implicitly  cal-
culate  future benefits and costs, but these are always discounted - a
dollar  tomorrow  is not the  same as  a dollar today.  In some  cases the
private  market  may  discount  the  future  too  much,  in  the collective
judgment of society, and federal  government  action may be required.
Soil  conservation  is  a  good  example.  For about  50  years  we  have
implicitly agreed,  as a society, that individuals  acting in private, free
markets  will allow  too much soil  to erode too  quickly for  the good  of
far-distant  future  generations.  We,  therefore,  have  federal  programs
to  help  reduce  erosion.  In  principle  nothing  precludes  state  or  local
action  to  overcome  the  myopia  of private  markets,  but the problems
created are often not suitable for state or local action,  as the soil con-
servation  example  illustrates.
Finally, federal action may be required not by theoretical  arguments
but because  of practical politics. The state of Vermont,  in its Act 250,
provided  technical  assistance  to  local  governments  to  help  them  ne-
gotiate more  effectively with large,  well-staffed and well-financed  de-
velopment companies.  The  federal  government  provides  uniform
standards  for activities  such as strip mining, the effect  of which is to
remove  the  opportunity  for  companies  to  play  off one  state  against
another to get relaxed mining rules. For some land use questions the
federal government may be able to provide technical assistance or set
some  "rules  of the  game"  that  substantially  benefit  state  and  local
governments.
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Federal  government  involvement  in  land  use  policy  can  be  con-
demned from a constitutional, philosophical and practical perspective.
Constitutional Arguments.  The federal Constitution  does not iden-
tify  direct  control  of privately-owned  land  as  a federal  prerogative.
Therefore, this power resides in the states. Federal land use programs,
such as those that characterize  Britain, Sweden, and much of Western
Europe are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.  To date, federal activ-
ities have  carefully  circumvented  the constitutional issue  by leaving
direct regulation to state and local governments,  but the federal  gov-
ernment's indirect role in land use decisions has increased.
Philosophical Arguments. Political and economic theory can be used
to argue against any public interference  in land use decisions, whether
from federal,  state or local governments.  Those who created the intel-
lectual foundation  for the republic - Jefferson,  Adams, Monroe, Mad-
ison,  and others  - relied  on  political  theory  that  held  that a  free
democratic  society  could only exist in a system of widespread private
property  ownership.  In this  philosophic  tradition,  the right to  freely
use  and  exchange  property  was  the ultimate  guarantor  of personal
political liberty. If government  were to control land use or ownership,
individuals would depend  on government for their economic survival.
Political liberty would be severely threatened  and eventually eroded.
Thus, private ownership and control of land was seen as a necessary
precondition  for  political and economic  liberty.  Any suggestion  of in-
creased  government  control  of  land use  must be  questioned  - the
burden of proof must rest squarely on those proposing any decrease  in
the rights of individuals  in property.
Economic theory can also be used to argue  against any government
involvement in land use activity. The price system allocates productive
resources  among  competing  uses.  Land  is  allocated  through  market
exchange in which buyers  with higher-value  uses in mind can outbid
those who would use the land in a lower-valued use. The market takes
the future into account because the price of land is determined by its
profitability,  not  only  in  the current  year  but  many  years  into the
future.  Individuals  and corporations  have  strong economic  incentives
to accurately  estimate the present and future earning  capacity of the
land.  The  land resources  of society  pass  into ownership  of those able
to use it in the most productive manner possible.
Both political and economic  theory can be used to argue that public
ownership  of land should  be  strictly  limited.  Government  ownership
can be viewed as a threat to political and economic  liberty in the same
way  as government  restriction of private property rights.  With a few
exceptions for common property resources and free-rider problems, eco-
nomic  theory  can  be  used to  argue  against  government  ownership,
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sector.
Obviously certain "negative externalities",  such as water pollution,
are  associated  with  land  allocation  in the private  market.  It can  be
argued  that this  problem  is  not inherent  in  the  market  but  results
from an unclear definition of property rights.  For example, if a prop-
erty right in clean water is defined,  either through regulatory  prohi-
bition  or  marketable  pollution  certificates,  the  market  system  can
provide both clean water and the most efficient possible use of the land
resource.
Practical  Arguments.  Even  if there  were  no  constitutional  con-
straints  on federal  action,  nor  philosophical  objectives  from political
or economic  theory,  it could be argued that federal planners  could not
possibly make good land use decisions in any case.  Land use planning
implies  the ability  to  calculate  future  benefits  and  costs  from alter-
native  land uses.  There  are no  scientific  techniques  for accurate  cal-
culations.  Although  corporate executives  may  have  no better  ability
than federal planners, those in the private sector have a much stronger
incentive  to spend the time  and energy  to make  accurate projections.
Their economic survival  is at stake.
Even assuming that public and private planners have the  same in-
centives,  federal-level  planners  could  not  possibly  amass  and  digest
the  large volume  of detailed information  necessary  to  make local,  or
even state land use decisions.  Only local governments come even close
to being able to generate and use such an information  base.
Alternately,  the  federal  government  might  set  detailed  standards
for local  government  to  follow.  But what standards?  Any attempt  to
anticipate the thousands of different local situations would produce an
inflexible  system  which would  not fit  many  situations  anyway.  The
only other option is to set extremely general standards which, in effect,
would  allow  all decisions  to  be made  locally.  The  result would  be no
change  in federal influence  on  land use,  coupled with a bureaucratic
rule-making  and  standard-checking  system.
Some  Case Studies
The federal  government's  role in land use policy is  pervasive.  Any
serious attempt to reduce the federal government's influence over land
use  decisions  will involve  massive  changes  in current  federal  activi-
ties. Unless one is prepared to dismantle hundreds  of federal programs,
it is irresponsible  to take a  simplistic position  against  all  federal  in-
volvement in land use. Alternately, unless one understands the nature
of specific  land use problems confronting  society and the consequences
of federal  action, it is irresponsible  to  argue that the  federal govern-
ment must  attempt  to  solve  any  land use problem  that might  arise.
There  can  be  no  responsible  position  on  the  overall  role  of federal
government  in land use. But there can be supportable  positions on the
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cases will be examined  in this section.
Protecting the Quantity of Farmland. The federal government has
only  recently  discovered  this  issue,  though the  states  and  localities
have  been debating  and acting on it for 60 years.  Nearly  every  state
has a program  of some type to encourage  a pattern of land use change
that protects  our best farmlands.  (5)  Regulatory power in this area  is
traditionally  delegated to  local  governments.  (2)  Several states  have
considered  or enacted  laws that encourage  establishment  of areas  or
districts of the best agricultural  lands. Thus state-wide discretion and
preferences  have been interjected  into  local government  decisions.
Although  the  federal  government  has not dealt  for  long  with the
farmland preservation  issue, there have been a few recent actions. The
Environmental  protection Agency enacted an administrative  policy in
1978 that requires consideration  of impacts on farmland  when giving
grants for new sewer and water systems.  (8)  USDA enacted a similar
policy  shortly afterwards.  It has been updated by the Reagan admin-
istration  with even  stronger statements  about  avoiding  actions that
threaten good farmlands when there are alternative ways to solve the
problem in question.  (12)  Further,  USDA administrative  rules to im-
plement environmental impact statement requirements of NEPA spe-
cifically  include effects  on prime farmland as an environmental  impact.
The National  Surface  Mining Control  and Reclamation  Act of 1977
requires that productive farmland be restored after the mining is com-
pleted  (there  is  a  real  question  as  to  whether that  is  physically  or
economically  feasible).  The  most positive  federal  action  in this  area
came  with  Subtitle  I  of the  1981  Agriculture  and  Food  Act.  While
considered  by many  food  policy  specialists  to  be  basically  an  after-
thought, the Farmland Protection  Policy  Act  is the first real expres-
sion of national interest in farmland protection  policy.
The case for greater  federal involvement  in protecting farmland can
be  simply stated.  On a very practical  level, recent federal  actions  for
farmland preservation  simply acknowledge the obvious - that federal
regulatory,  spending  and  taxing powers  already  have  enormous  im-
pacts  on available  lands for farming.  (10)
The  question  is not whether  the  federal  government  should  affect
farmland decisions, but whether it should acknowledge  the impacts  of
existing programs  and seek  information  needed to make rational  de-
cisions on the matter.  It can be argued that this is relatively  noncon-
troversial and is the minimum federal  action consistent with responsible
government.
On a more  abstract  level, it can be  argued that protecting  agricul-
tural land is akin  to  guarding the national  heritage  of future  gener-
ations.  Individuals,  or local or state governments  have little incentive
to preserve  the nation's agricultural  land base  - the benefits would
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erations, but the costs would be immediate  and borne locally.
Just  as  many  states  identified  land  uses  of "more  than  local  con-
cern", so should the federal government  exercise discretion  at the na-
tional  level,  to  focus  on  those  farmlands  of the  nation  of particular
quality that may cross state boundaries  and may represent a national
interest more than state or local. Iowa's farmland is not Iowa's alone.
It represents a significant national asset that should not be liquidated
through  negligence  or inattention.  The  motive  cannot  be short-term
farmland  adequacy  because it is clear that no short-term problem ex-
ists. A more valid purpose is to encourage,  not force,  a land use change
pattern that recognizes relative productive quality of farmland to pre-
serve the option of use  for food production in the more distant future.
Finally, it can be argued that the federal government should protect
farmlands that have particular  national value  as the  production base
of a regional  agricultural  economy  or because  of certain unique  nat-
ural  character.  Examples  of the latter are  the  fruit producing lands
near  oceans  and major lakes which have  a unique micro-climate  cru-
cial for fruit production.  The  loss of southern California's  orange  groves
is truely  a national  concern. Some might argue that the value of such
unique lands  will be reflected  in farmers'  willingness to  pay,  or that
state and  local  governments  will  take action to retain lands  already
in active  production, but it is unwise  to count on either possibility.
The  federal  government  should  assure that  nonfarm  development
pressures  are  funneled  elsewhere.  No  government  can  permanently
force a land use pattern that makes little economic  sense.  Some lands
must change  use.  But when there are locational  choices, particularly
when lands have features of unique importance to production, the ben-
efit of the doubt  should go  to agriculture.
The  case against  federal  involvement  in agricultural  land preser-
vation can  also be stated  simply. First,  it can be argued that there  is
no  problem  with  land  availability  for domestic  food  production,  now
or in the next half-century and beyond. Also, the only pressure on the
U.S. land base  comes  from agricultural  exports,  so  even if a problem
were to  develop in the distant future,  we could  make  it disappear by
simply  cutting  our  exports.  Put  simply,  there  is  no  need  for federal
action because there  is no problem.
Although agricultural  land  conversion  has  obviously  been viewed
as a problem  by almost  every state  and by hundreds  of local  govern-
ments, it can be argued that the federal government should not become
involved because  these matters are of strictly  local, or state concern.
The land use conflicts  around a major  city are  not the responsibility
of the  federal  government.  True,  the  effects may  be severe  and may
cause  serious  problems  locally;  but  very few  of these problems  cross
state boundaries.  Therefore,  it is argued, the federal  government  should
not become involved.
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area  is in  public  ownership,  totaling  about  750  million  acres,  or the
total size  of the Common Market countries.  The vast majority of that
is  federal  land.  Still,  most  of the  productive  land  once  held  by the
government  has been  transferred  to private  owners.  The  remaining
lands  are  managed  for their  saleable  commodities  such  as timber  or
minerals  and common property resources such as fish or wildlife that
are  accessible but not appropriable.
The case  against federal involvement  is simple: the federal  govern-
ment should not hold lands that are economically  productive.  Overall
efficiency  is  more likely if management  decisions  are in the hands of
those with  a clear stake  in the result.  There  is no reason to assume
public managers can produce timber more efficiently than private and
the taxpayers  will be saved the management  cost.
Private individuals  and  companies should have the chance  to pur-
chase those lands where it is possible to economically grow and market
timber.  There  will be no  bids on  land where  timber production  costs
more than it returns to society.  Neither should these lands be used for
timber  by the federal  government,  since  national  income  will  be  re-
duced by any timber activity on these lands. Similar arguments could
be applied  to rangeland.
On the other hand, a case for federal ownership can be based on the
fact that some  land uses,  such as  wilderness,  have  common property
or public  good  aspects.  There  are  also certain nonuser benefits  asso-
ciated with the public lands - people  gain even without going to the
land to claim their benefits.  (13) These benefits  are true public goods
in  the  sense  that  use  by  one  does  not  diminish  its  availability  for
others.  Wilderness  experience  may  be  a public  good  until too  many
people take advantage  of open access  and start encountering  each other
on the  trail.  Congestion  costs  turn  the  public  good  into  a  common
property  resource, where  those who get there first get the benefit (4).
The  appropriate  role for the federal  government  in providing these
services  of public  land differs  by the type  of service.  Removing  pro-
ductive  timber land leaves an enormous  acreage  of federal  land with
value primarily  for its common property,  public good and nonuser at-
tributes.  While there are many joint products available  on the public
lands, there is no need  to manage  all public lands  for all the services
they might offer. Why not intensively manage the good lands for tim-
ber  or range,  and the rest  for the other  services  available  from the
wild  and beautiful lands of the public domain?
Federal  action in this area is based on the argument that the ben-
efits are  nationwide  and any  costs of nondevelopment  should be  dis-
tributed  nationwide  as  well.  The  open-access  federal  lands  provide
invaluable public  good and common  property  services  that are more
valuable than the flow of services  available from some other manage-
ment system,  such as state or private  ownership.
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Federal government action in land use policy implies a policy bound-
ary that  includes the entire nation  as the  affected  public.  Discretion
exercised  by federal bureaucrats  is  likely to  produce results different
from those associated with state policies or private actions, thus people
on  the land may  feel they are  worse  off than before.  The  decision to
have federal  action implies the judgment that the benefits to "all" are
worth the inconvenience  of a few.
We  have  always  paid  great  homage  to  the  institution  of private
property  ownership,  but public  support  for  absolute  rights  of owner-
ship may be less ubiquitous than has been assumed.  A declining pro-
portion  of  American  citizens  have  access  to  land  through  private
ownership. There  is increasing support for restricting private  actions
that  impose  costs  on  others  or deprive  them of certain  benefits.  The
American people  expect to be protected from private actions that pol-
lute the water  or air.  They  expect  actions that guard the  productive
capability of our agriculture by future consumers. And they are willing
to impose a bit on private  landowners to  do these  things.
In tracing  the  consequences  of various  federal  policy  alternatives
the most important change  to  identify is the shift in WHO has  influ-
ence  in making the  land use decision.  The "rules of the game" in the
political process  will determine  the course  or channel  through which
a land use issue must pass on its way to resolution. These "rules" will
determine  the relative power  of various  groups to  influence  the out-
come. If the ultimate decision is made in the private sector,  "the rules
of the  game"  will constrain  individual  choice  and  will define  the  set
of possible outcomes  vithin the  market setting.
Land use is determined competitively  in both the private and public
spheres.  In the private  sector,  land goes  to those  able  and willing to
put it to its highest-valued  use.  In the public  sector,  individuals and
groups  struggle to establish  rules for decision-making  that will favor
their own interest in land use decisions. The rules for making decisions
on land use, in both public and private sectors,  will largely determine
the land use outcome. The crux of the debate is not whether the market
can allocate  land resources "better" than the public sector,  or whether
the federal  government  is better able to  correct for "imperfections"  in
private markets than state or local governments.  Rather the debate  is
over  whose  interests  should  be served  by  public  involvement  (or dis-
involvement)  in land use decision-making.  That is the issue that should
be debated in the  1980s.
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